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Abstract
More than half a century ago, Frantz Fanon made two pivotal observations about cataclysmic convulsions that
would engulf Central and Eastern Africa. The first referred to his prescient observation that the African
continent resembles a revolver, and Zaire is the trigger (Fanon, 1966 [2005]). His clairvoyant statement eerily
prefigures what political commentators have, since the 1990s, characterized as the potential starting point of
Africa’s First World War (Williams, 2013). After the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (formerly known as Zaire) became the site where warring armies from more than four
neighboring countries came to battle one another, presumably to defend the legitimate existence of a proxy
group in the country. Zimbabwean and Angolan forces were aligned with the regime of Laurent Kabila, while
Rwanda and Uganda—the original patrons of Laurent Kabila and his putsch-were now his sworn enemies.
Fanon’s second observation warned against the ramifications and implications of a Somali-Ethiopian war
whose foundation was nationalistic (Fanon, 1969). This warning came with devastating consequences. The
resulting political, social, and economic landscape of Somalia compels us to examine the contours of both the
centripetal and centrifugal forces that still animate social upheavals. This requires a bold reexamination of
analytic categories, and the ability to envision new ones to cope with the new reality. In this essay, I confine
myself to the new reality in the Horn of Africa. I will engage in a comparative analysis by telescoping a
panoramic view of regional history. This new telescoping and reality must be understood, not from the
vantage point of national disintegration by way of political conflict, but through the perspective that social
transformation and migration work as the ultimate engine of social change (Richerson and Boyd, 2008).
Keywords
African and African American Studies
Disciplines
African Languages and Societies | Politics and Social Change | Regional Sociology
Comments
This article is from Journal of Somali Studies 1 (2014): 91–101.
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/soc_las_pubs/8
91 
 
 
 
 
The Somali Question 
 
Abdi M. Kusow 
Iowa State University 
kusow@iastate.edu 
…………………………………………………………………………. 
 
More than half a century ago, Frantz Fanon made two pivotal 
observations about cataclysmic convulsions that would engulf 
Central and Eastern Africa. The first referred to his prescient 
observation that the African continent resembles a revolver, and Zaire 
is the trigger (Fanon, 1966 [2005]). His clairvoyant statement eerily 
prefigures what political commentators have, since the 1990s, 
characterized as the potential starting point of Africa’s First World 
War (Williams, 2013). After the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly known as Zaire) became 
the site where warring armies from more than four neighboring 
countries came to battle one another, presumably to defend the 
legitimate existence of a proxy group in the country. Zimbabwean 
and Angolan forces were aligned with the regime of Laurent Kabila, 
while Rwanda and Uganda—the original patrons of Laurent Kabila 
and his putsch-were now his sworn enemies. Fanon’s second 
observation warned against the ramifications and implications of a 
Somali-Ethiopian war whose foundation was nationalistic (Fanon, 
1969). This warning came with devastating consequences. The 
resulting political, social, and economic landscape of Somalia compels 
us to examine the contours of both the centripetal and centrifugal 
forces that still animate social upheavals. This requires a bold 
reexamination of analytic categories, and the ability to envision new 
ones to cope with the new reality. In this essay, I confine myself to the 
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new reality in the Horn of Africa. I will engage in a comparative 
analysis by telescoping a panoramic view of regional history. This 
new telescoping and reality must be understood, not from the 
vantage point of national disintegration by way of political conflict, 
but through the perspective that social transformation and migration 
work as the ultimate engine of social change (Richerson and Boyd, 
2008).    
 
Horn of Africa in Focus 
 
On New Year’s Eve 1991, the entire Somali state collapsed, and the 
people of Somalia began the last decade of the twentieth century 
mourning, instead of celebrating, the onset of a new millennium. To 
be sure, this kind of political conflict is not confined to Somalia; it 
remains a significant feature of the region. The Horn of Africa, which 
encompasses Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, South Sudan, 
Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, is one of, if not the most conflict-prone 
zones in the world. Several interlocking conflict clusters exist in the 
region. The first involves the long-standing civil strife in South Sudan, 
which extends into Uganda and Chad. The second centers around the 
complicated network of conflicts that link Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Somalia, and Kenya (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen, 2007).  
Each country is characterized by complicated and interlocked 
internal social and economic conflicts. Over the past three decades, 
every country in the region except Kenya has experienced a context-
altering social conflict. Since the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie 
by the Derge in the early 1970s, Ethiopia has undergone radical social 
transformations. Once considered a cohesive Christian nation 
surrounded by an ocean of hostile Muslim populations, Ethiopia’s 
manufactured and official narrative, by the 1970s, rapidly morphed 
into an internally conflicted nation with multiple identities, voices, 
and contested narratives. Eritrea’s independence honeymoon is on 
the brink of becoming a nightmare with various ethnic and religious 
demarcation lines and conflicts. After a protracted civil war, South 
Sudan seceded from Sudan to become the newest member of the 
African Union. Within a year of declaring its independence, however, 
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South Sudan descended into political chaos. Somalia, the supposedly 
most homogeneous country on the continent, has shown that 
homogeneity, even if it were empirically true, is not an indication of 
political stability. Even Kenya, the region’s most economically and 
politically stable country, is facing a legitimization crisis (Habermas, 
1973), as are many other countries in the region. 
What is more problematic is the apparent inability of much of the 
scholarship in the region, particularly Somali scholarship, to 
comprehend and contextualize the ever-expanding violence and the 
resultant dissolution of the nation-state. This is partly because the 
outlook of both Somali scholarship and Somali society has generally 
remained provincial, unable to theoretically and methodologically 
locate the Somali condition within the larger social, political, and 
demographic contexts of the region and the world. Somali scholarship 
suffers from what I consider to be an “ostrich syndrome.” By ostrich 
syndrome, I mean a symptom that some people exhibit or manifest 
when they are confronted by confounding and conflicting social, 
political, or controversial issues in their lives. Instead of confronting 
the issues, such people would rather ignore them or, as ostriches do, 
bury their head in the sand, hoping that the threat will go away. This 
is why current Somali scholarship is obsessed with everyday 
dynamics--Al-Shabab versus the federal government, Clan X versus 
Clan Y, or which clan now controls which region—rather than 
discerning the gathering storm of impending social and demographic 
forces.  
My purpose in this essay is to force Somali scholarship out of the 
ostrich syndrome and compel it to see the effect of regional social and 
demographic transformations on the social and geographic boundary 
of Somaliness. My argument is that, unless Somalis can subdue the 
current disintegration of Somalia, the ramparts of the nation as we 
know them will be severely tested—if not unhinged—by the 
demographic and economic forces of its neighbors. The purpose here 
is not to sound a false alarm, but to compel Somali scholars to reflect 
on relevant comparative and contrastive morphologies of migrations 
and counter-migrations. This increased awareness would help us to 
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reassess and gauge the ramifications of the ongoing immigrations and 
economic and geopolitical tendencies of Ethiopia and Kenya on the 
social and geographic boundaries of Somaliness. 
The vexing nature of the political conflict and the legitimization 
crisis facing the region is most revealed in Somalia. Over the past 
twenty years, the Somali crisis has been articulated as an immediate 
conflict between differently named central governements with 
various groups claiming one form of camouflaged identity or another. 
This is not surprising because this conflict will mark its twenty-fourth 
anniversary next year and has taken on many different names. If 
history is a guide, this stubborn saga may prove to be nothing more 
than the newest episode of a political soap opera that cinematically 
kills certain characters and replaces them with new ones so that what 
actually changes is the naming of the oppositional binary characters 
rather than the conflict itself. 
 
The Dynamics Within 
 
On the eve of the Somali Civil War in 1991, the conflict, at least on the 
surface, was between United Somali Congress (USC) versus Siyaad 
Barre; within a year, it changed to Ali Mahdi versus Aideed. After 
twenty years and several character changes, we now have the 
National Federal Government versus Al-Shabab, Ahlu Sunna Wal-
Jamaaca, and other self-proclaimed regional states. However, what 
remains unresolved is how to move the Somali nation away from 
divisive clans toward a more unified national identity articulated 
through one or another shared interest. Both Sheikh Aweys 
Mohamed and Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, for example, 
attempted to transcend Somali clan divisiveness by introducing their 
own Islamic movements, which were infused with local, clan-based 
sensibilities. The most revealing example of the Somali attempts to 
transcend tribalism came during the Siyaad Barre regime. One of 
Barre’s first actions was to “bury tribalism” by burning the tribe in the 
form of an effigy at pre-organized gatherings in every city and town 
in Somalia. These burnings dictated that from then onward, tribalism 
was dead, and any discussion of the idea would not be tolerated. As 
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with all dictators during the initial phase of solidifying their power, 
Barre camouflaged his activities under the banner of scientific 
socialism. He claimed that Somalia will be economically self-sufficient 
in a decade and that all Somalis will prosper regardless of their clan 
identity. However, within a few years, it was clear to the average 
Somali that Barre was engaging in tribalism by recruiting members of 
his clan and strategically placing them in important political, 
economic, and military positions.  
The Somali inability to transcend tribalism is revealed in Amin 
Amir’s 2006 cartoon, which shows a criminal being dragged by a 
member of the Islamic Counts Union (AminAmir.com). The Islamic 
Courts Union representative says, “Behaviors of the old days are no 
longer acceptable. I will now take you to the Islamic Courts Union’s 
jail.” The criminal responds, “Please take me to the court of my clan.” 
A bystander says, “The criminal is correct. Take him to the court of 
his clan; they are the same anyway” (http://aminarts.com). I reference 
this cartoon not to suggest that the Islamic Courts Union was simply 
a proxy for clan motives, but to highlight the power of clan identities 
in informing religious, ideological, and nationalist identities in 
Somalia. More important, clan identities inform who is and who is 
not considered an enemy. If the roles of Ethiopia and Kenya over the 
past few years are examined, one will find that each country was 
considered as an enemy by one clan and a friend by another. This 
means that, in Somali clan politics, determinations about whether a 
country is an external enemy or a friend depends on the prevailing 
clan power politics and the balance of power between the clans. In the 
case of the controversy surrounding the supporters of the self-
declared Jubbaland and supporters of the recently created state of 
Southwestern Somalia, Kenya is either a friend or a foe depending on 
where one’s allegiances lie. Also, if one examines Somali Islamic 
movements, one will find that they emcompass diverse outlooks, 
objectives, and practices as informed by clan, ecological, and 
subsistence variables, making it difficult to concieve of a movement 
that can appeal to all Somalis. The reason why Somalis cannot 
transcend tribalism is that all national and local identities are 
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conflated with clan identities, making it difficult to tell one from the 
other. 
The inability to start a movement that is able to transcend 
parochial, clan, or ethnic ontologies is not isolated to the Somali 
situation. Similar unappreciated and misundersood complexities are 
observable in countries throughout the region. This is because the 
conventional historiography that informed much of the scholarship 
on the Horn of Africa has been derived from the thesis that the main 
source of the region’s political, social, and economic crises resulted 
from the colonial demarcation of state boundaries, creating 
anthropologically blurred social and physical boundaries that are 
buttressed by neo-colonialism. This kind of scholarship is, of course, 
not unique to the Horn of Africa, but is a general part of African 
scholarship.  
 
Postcolonial Geopolitical Dynamics 
 
Over the past fifty years, this scholarship has articulated various 
African problems as well as identities in terms of resistance to 
colonialism and structural adjustment problems among other areas. 
The usage of resistance to colonialism, structural adjustment issues, 
and postcolonial dictators as the only categories for analyzing the 
region’s social and political realities has created two conceptual 
problems. First, the focus on resistance has created a condition in 
which external interventions and international geopolitical interests 
have been indiscriminately used as the main turning points that 
supposedly arrested the cultural and historical moments of the 
region’s past. Second, resistance to colonial occupation and 
postcolonial geopolitical dynamics has created a situation in which 
each country’s population has been portrayed as a homogeneous 
entity, and the only acknowledged differences and distinctions were 
because of the colonized and colonizer binary (Cooper, 1994). The 
point here is not to deny or question the negative effect of European 
economic and social structures on colonized societies, but to 
acknowledge that such an ontological position does not speak to 
contemporary social and political realities in the Horn of Africa. In 
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other words, the region’s social and political contexts are 
fundamentally different from what they were two decades ago. This 
kind of historiography cannot account for the fact that the 
technological, demographic, and social contexts within which the 
regional social conflicts take place have become complicated. Recent 
advances in transportation and communication systems have 
compressed both time and space, creating a condition in which the 
flow of ideas, social action, and people has been transnationalized so 
that the traditional hegemony of the nation-state cannot be sustained 
empirically (Kearney 1995; Basch et al. 1992).   
Demographically, the unending conflict in the region has led to an 
emigration of hundreds of thousands from the region, setting the 
foundation for a large, influential diaspora in Europe and North 
America. In addition, the conflict increased the level of migration 
within and between countries such that each country has a significant 
number of immigrants from other countries in the region. Underlying 
these local social difficulties, however, is demographic 
transformation, which is another transformative variable that has not 
been accounted for. I will spend the remainder of the paper 
elaborating on this issue. 
 
The Dynamics of Social Transformation and Shifts in Identity 
  
 The idea of social transformation is intended to capture both the 
demographic and identity shifts that have occurred in the region over 
the past three decades and explain how these modifications may alter 
the political and power dynamics of the region. Over the past thirty 
years, the Horn of Africa has experienced one of its most significant 
demographic and population transformations in history. Prior to the 
1990s, there was minimal migration between countries in the region. 
Since the Somali Civil War, hundreds of thousands of Somalis have 
fled to Ethiopia and settled in Addis Ababa and other regions of the 
country. A significant number of Ethiopians have immigrated to 
Somalia, particularly to the north and northeast, and Djibouti. When I 
visited Djibouti few years ago, I realized there was an increasing 
influx of Ethiopian immigrants in the country. My short visit to Addis 
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Ababa also confirmed the existence of a significant Somali immigrant 
population in the city. This is on top of the Somali Ethiopian 
population in what is officially known as Zone Five, or Kilika 
Shanaad, which houses about 10 percent of the total Ethiopian 
population. The number is significantly larger if the Somali 
immigrant population in Ethiopia is included. Both Djibouti and 
northern Somalia will likely experience a larger influx of Ethiopian 
immigrants. If this trend continues, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia 
will have significant ethnic populations from each side of their 
national border. Similar trends will appear in Eritrea, Kenya, and 
Sudan as well. The region will be divided into immigrant sending or 
destination centers. This pattern may change the complex ethnic 
dynamics of each country so that the meaning of nationalism will be 
replaced with one based on economic opportunities. 
This demographic transformation is further facilitated by 
increasing economic interdependency within the region. One clear 
example of this is the economic relationship between Ethiopia and 
Djibouti. In 2002, Ethiopia and Djibouti signed an electric power 
sharing agreement. This project costs more than US$80 million, 
including US$33 million from the African Development Bank and 
US$56 million from AfDB Bank Group. The agreement will likely 
increase the region’s economic viability. More important, this project 
will further interdependence within the region, which will, along 
with population movement, change its social and political dynamics. 
The project will result in the economies of Ethiopia and Djibouti being 
so closely linked that any regional conflict will paralyze both 
countries and, by extension, Somalia.  
One of the most revealing examples of this demographic 
transformation is found in the United States. Over the past two 
centuries, the United States has been transformed from a primarily 
white society with small black and native populations to one with 
large non-white populations. Current population projections indicate 
that by 2050, the non-white population will be nearly half of the total 
population. We already see the social and political consequences of 
this transformation in the election of President Obama, an idea that 
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political pundits would not have entertained just a decade ago. If the 
effect of demography is as important in the Horn of Africa as it is in 
the United States, the region will experience similar outcomes in the 
next fifty years or so. This shift will be even more significant given the 
increasing economic interdependency between the countries of the 
region, particularly Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Given the current 
relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Ethiopian economy 
will become increasingly dependent on Somalia and Djibouti because 
both countries are natural markets for Ethiopia. Because Ethiopia has 
the second largest population on the continent, Somalia and Djibouti 
will remain destinations for Ethiopian immigrants, which will, most 
likely, reconfigure the demographics of both countries.  
The most significant demographic transformations will likely 
occur in Somalia and Djibouti. Since the Somali-speaking population 
is the smallest in the region, it will experience the most noticeable 
social and demographic shifts. Despite its size, the Somali-speaking 
population represents the most dispersed and most mobile 
community in the region. The size, mobility, and presence of the 
Somali population in Ethiopia and Kenya have internal and external 
implications for Somalia. If the quality of life in Djibouti and Somalia 
is better than in Ethiopia, which is very likely, Djibouti and Somalia 
will experience a significant influx of Ethiopians, which will, as I 
pointed out earlier, transform the ethnic boundaries of Somaliness. On 
the one hand, due to their large numbers in Kenya and Ethiopia, 
Somalis will influence the political dynamics of both countries. In 
other words, the Somali-speaking population will play a role in 
transforming the region’s political and identity dynamics. 
 
Conclusion   
 
The Horn of Africa is probably in the midst of its second great 
migration, one that will parallel or eclipse the sixteenth-century 
migration that cemented the region’s current settlement and identity 
patterns. Despite the lack of written record, this sixteenth century 
migration was spearheaded by the so-called great Somali migration 
waves that pushed the Oromo communities further upward into the 
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Ethiopian highlands. This migration, which was allegedly stopped by 
the British colonial administration in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, is credited with the current identity settlement 
patterns of the region. The migration of Somali people may have been 
caused by long droughts and clan warfare. I suspect similar 
conditions are at play in the region today, except that this time, the 
migration push may not just come from Somalia, but all sides. The 
most important component of this modern migration may be the 
emigration from Ethiopia to Somalia. A new factor in the current 
migration is the possibility of increased interdependency between 
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, which will simultaneously make 
economic opportunities, not ethnic identities, into the primary motive 
of settlement patterns and increase the interdependency of the 
countries’ political and economic structures. 
These processes will probably have the greatest effect on Somalia 
and Djibouti. Because Somalia and Djibouti have two of the smallest 
populations in the region, significant Ethiopian emigration will 
certainly increase the ethnic composition and diversity of both 
Somalia and Djibouti. My purpose is not to suggest that migration 
and demographic transformations are inherently a problem. To the 
contrary, it is, in fact, an engine for social change and economic 
development for the entire region. But my ultimate purpose is to 
gently force Somali scholarship out of the ostrich syndrome and to 
embrace the methodological imagination that will allow it to 
understand the Somali condition from a context increasingly 
characterized by continuous and dynamic social and demographic 
transformations.   
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